Confusion as Smokescreen: Why the SIR Debate Matters Now

PDT Achary, former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha and a respected constitutional expert, speaks to OBC’s Karthika S and Sneha M on the legal inconsistencies, political risks, and federal tensions emerging from the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) process. In this interview, he explains the constitutional implications, the gaps in implementation, and the wider impact on India’s democratic framework.

The first phase of SIR was carried out in Bihar in a haste, disregarding widespread concerns and resulting in the exclusion of lakhs of voters. How do you see this impacting the ongoing polls? Could you elaborate on the constitutional gravity of this exercise itself—and the manner in which it was implemented in the state?

The first thing to point out is that the SIR exercise that is being carried out right now is not incorporated in the Representation of the People Act, 1950. Two things are mentioned in the Act: the first is revision, and the second is special revision. A special revision is a procedure that is restricted to any one constituency. If the Election Commission supposes that some major demographic change has taken place in a particular constituency, they have the authority to conduct a special revision in that constituency. Or normally, two kinds of revisions are there – one that is conducted just before an election, called a summary revision. The second is carried out in accordance with the directions received by the Election Commission. This one is a comprehensive and intensive revision. Even if the rule stipulates an intensive revision, the RPA does not have any mention of the term ‘intensive’. But what is being said and carried out now is a special intensive revision. Such terminology is not used anywhere in the law. 

The summary revision (conducted just before the election) is mandatory. It would be skipped only if the Election Commission decides that, for certain specific reasons, the revision should not be conducted. In the normal course of action, the Election Commission is bound to carry this out. This revision is not intensive. So, speaking strictly in legal terms, we can say that the process of SIR that is being carried out now is not in accordance with the law.

The second phase of the SIR has now begun. Several non-BJP–ruled states have already challenged the process in court, yet it appears unlikely to be halted anytime soon. With states like Kerala heading to the polls next year, what could be the implications of this exercise in that context? Could the kind of large-scale exclusion witnessed in Bihar repeat itself elsewhere?

Speaking from the experience in Bihar, an estimated 47 lakh people have been excluded from the list. Initially, almost 65 lakh people were not in the list, after which about 20 lakh names were added back. So how did that happen? How can that data be broken down? Suppose a certain number of people have died, and another set has migrated to other states and settled there permanently. Apart from this, the Election Commission has not released the names of the people who were excluded from the list on the grounds that they were not “citizens.” That is what we need to know.

The term used is “ordinary resident.” For instance, if you are from Bihar but work in Kerala without intending to settle there permanently, you are not considered an ordinary resident of Kerala. You may visit your home state occasionally and avoid buying property where you work, since your stay is temporary. In essence, only two categories of people are excluded from the list — those who have passed away, and those who have migrated to another state and become ordinary residents there. 

Apart from these two categories, we do not know on what basis the rest of the people were removed from the list. According to Article 326, a person must be an Indian citizen to have the right to vote. So, we have to assume that they were removed on the grounds that they are not “citizens”.

The Election Commission does not have the power to deny a person’s citizenship; only the Home Ministry can do that. The responsibility to implement the election law lies with the Home Ministry. Therefore, the Home Ministry is the competent authority to specify which documents people should use to prove their citizenship. Till date, the Home Ministry of India has not issued such a list, even though it is required to do so.

They are now assigning that responsibility to the Election Commission of India. The ECI, however, according to the Constitution and the law, has no authority to decide which documents—such as Aadhaar or voter ID—can or cannot be accepted as proof of citizenship. As a result, a state of ambiguity persists. Since no one is questioning the validity of this move, the ECI is functioning on its own terms and asking citizens to furnish proof of their citizenship. The Supreme Court has directed the ECI to accept Aadhaar and voter ID, yet it is clearly stated on the Aadhaar card itself that it is not proof of citizenship. This has created complete confusion, and that very confusion is being used as a smokescreen to exclude people from the list.

In states like West Bengal, where there is a large migrant population, wouldn’t they be at a greater risk of being excluded from the list?

Of course, they will be. That is why it has been said earlier that the Supreme Court should intervene so that all this chaos and confusion can be resolved at once. If citizens are being asked to prove their citizenship, the competent authority-the home ministry- must clearly specify what documents are required to do so. The Election Commission can only verify the documents, not determine what they should be. Unless that is clarified, how can this confusion ever be resolved?

Assam is also poll-bound next year, but a decision has been taken not to conduct the SIR there. How could this be interpreted?

In Assam, the process of drafting the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is underway, which may be the reason behind the decision not to carry out the SIR. The NRC, in effect, serves the same purpose. So we could say that the government ultimately envisions the process of SIR as a pathway to the NRC, in every state.

In recent months, opposition leader Rahul Gandhi has made serious allegations of “vote chori” (vote theft), claiming that lakhs of irregularities were found in the voters’ lists of certain constituencies. What would be the democratic and constitutional repercussions of this? And is the opposition equipped to handle a crisis of this magnitude?

To begin with, all the opposition parties have not come together in raising the allegations related to vote chori. Rahul Gandhi first raised the issue in Karnataka and later in Haryana. But since then, the discussion seems to have lost momentum. Apart from occasionally reiterating these allegations, the movement does not appear to be gaining any ground. Most opposition parties have remained silent on the matter. It hasn’t gained traction as a major campaign issue, nor have they been able to mobilize all opposition parties around it.

This implies that people may not fully believe in the allegations, as these issues often appear too technical and distant for them to relate to. In Bihar too, this did not become a campaign issue—the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) focused instead on local concerns. For ordinary people, as the saying goes, “roti, kapda, makaan” (food, clothing, and shelter) matter more. The problems they face are linked to jobs, livelihoods, and basic necessities. Their reactions can be triggered only by issues that directly affect their everyday lives. The bottom line is that, although the issues raised by Rahul Gandhi are serious, they have not been able to mobilize them as a campaign issue, and the Election Commission has completely ignored them. It might be their deliberate strategy.

The question that deeply troubles us today is the visible decline of cooperative federalism. The biggest example is the ongoing tussle between governors and the elected governments of certain non-BJP-ruled states. In states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the respective governors have even refused to read the government’s customary address or give assent to bills passed by the assembly, among other actions. What are the constitutional powers of the office of the governor, and where are its limits defined? Since there is no constitutional provision for impeachment, how can an elected government counter such misuse of power?

The Supreme Court has clarified the powers of the governor in several verdicts. In practice, the governor has no independent power – all authority rests with the elected government. The governor cannot act on their own discretion and must function according to the advice of the elected government. Constitutionally, it is designed that way. The governor cannot make any decisions related to executive matters. Actions such as refusing to read the customary address are constitutionally incorrect. In my opinion, there are  two viable solutions to address this issue. The first is to approach the court and obtain a directive. 

The second, which has not been widely discussed, but particularly relevant here, is to invoke Article 355. According to this article, it is the Union’s duty to protect every state from external aggression and internal disturbance, and to ensure that the state government functions in accordance with the Constitution. If a governor withholds assent to laws passed by the state government, thereby obstructing the legislative process, it creates a constitutional crisis — the government becomes unable to function. In such a situation, the responsibility to resolve the crisis rests with the Union government. Since the governor is appointed by the President, under Article 355 the President is constitutionally bound to intervene and resolve the issue. Therefore, the Chief Minister can request the President to direct the governor to perform their constitutional duties without fail. These, in my view, are the practical solutions available.

The BJP government is pushing the One Nation, One Election proposal very aggressively and has even appointed a committee to study the feasibility of implementing it in the upcoming general elections. In a country like India, the problems that could arise from implementing such a system all at once would go far beyond what we can imagine. From a constitutional standpoint, how can this be implemented? And how serious would the practical challenges be?

As an idea, the concept of One Nation, One Election is not inherently problematic. We have followed that system before — from 1952 to 1967, elections were conducted in that manner. However, after 1967, the situation changed. Several state assemblies were dismissed, and the synchronised order collapsed. Once that order was disrupted, it became very difficult to restore it. I do not believe the proposals being put forward now are sound. Under the plan, the tenure of state assemblies would be determined by the tenure of the Parliament. Once implemented, the state assemblies would no longer have fixed terms. If the Parliament were to be dissolved after three years, all the state assemblies would also have to be dissolved, necessitating fresh elections.

Ours is a federal country, where states enjoy their own autonomy and powers. Linking the tenure of state assemblies to that of the Parliament would directly undermine that autonomy. Moreover, if a state assembly were dissolved mid-term — say, after two years — a re-election would be required just for the remaining three years. So what, then, is the real point of this entire One Nation, One Election exercise?

There is no practical benefit to it. I say this for two reasons. The first point often made in its favour is that it would reduce election expenditure. Election expenditure has two components: one is the expenditure incurred by the Election Commission, which comes from the annual budget and may amount to around ₹7,000–8,000 crore. However, if we look at the estimated total spending during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, it was around ₹66,000 crore — this includes the expenditure made by political parties.

According to their argument, if elections are held only once every five years, the surplus money could be channelled into other public purposes. But how many hospitals or schools have ever been built by any of these political parties with such savings? Have you heard of such a thing? I think this is a very hollow argument. Moreover, they cannot bring it into effect as they lack the required majority in Parliament.

The upcoming delimitation exercise in India — the first since 1971 — is currently expected to take place after the 2026 Census. Since it will be carried out on the basis of population, southern states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which effectively implemented birth control measures, are likely to lose a significant number of seats, while northern states will gain an undue advantage. How do you view this issue?

It has the potential to become a serious problem. According to the existing provisions of the Constitution, there is a proportional relationship between a state’s population and the total number of seats allotted to it, and this proportion must be uniform across all states. Uttar Pradesh, for instance, has 80 parliament constituencies and a population of around 25 crore, and Kerala has 20 for 3.5 crore. One possible solution is to maintain the current formula for determining this proportion as it is, without making any changes to it.

But the problem of ensuring adequate representation  for ordinary citizens in Parliament also exists in highly populated states like Uttar Pradesh.

We cannot go with both approaches. Some marginal adjustments can be made, but that should be the limit. Ideally, a new formula that is fair and beneficial to all parties involved should be developed to resolve this serious issue. However, to implement such a formula, the existing provisions of the Constitution would have to be amended.